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Abstract
Explanations for hindsight effects in the context of managerial decision
appraisal are described and classified into two categories: cognitive and
motivational. Within the latter category, a further distinction is drawn
between a "knew-it-all-along" and an "escalation-of-commitment" explanation.
The viability of each explanation is investigated in an experiment in which
subjects evaluated a committee's decisions to invest in one of two competing
projects. The prior commitment of the evaluator and the valence of the
project's outcome were manipulated. Experimental results based on the
performance appraisals fully support the cognitive explanation, but provide
little support for the motivational explanations. Theoretical implications, as
well as implications for performance appraisal systems design, are discussed.
4
Hindsight Performance Appraisal
3
An Experimental Investigation of
Cognitive and Motivational Explanations For
Hindsight Effects in Managerial Decision Appraisals
Research investigating performance appraisal within organizations
indicates that such evaluations often are affected by personal, contextual and
psychometric factors (see Feldman, 1981 and DeNisi, Cafferty and Meglino, 1984
for reviews of this literature) . One potentially significant contextual factor
is that performance appraisals generally are made in varying degrees of
hindsight (i.e., after outcomes of performances are at least partially known).
Another such factor is that evaluators often have been involved previously with
the evaluatee's decision process. This paper describes an experimental
investigation of cognitive and motivational explanations for hindsight effects
(i.e., the effects of outcome knowledge) on managerial decision appraisals when
the evaluator is not independent of the evaluatee and/or the course of action
being evaluated.
Judgment and decision making studies, usually involving tasks other than
performance appraisal, generally report that the probability subjects assess
for an event when outcomes are not known (foresight) is significantly smaller
than the "prior" probability that subjects assess for the same event when it is
known to have occurred (hindsight) (see Christensen-Szalanski and Fobian (1988)
for a meta-analysis of research hindsight effects). Mitchell and Kalb (1981),
extending hindsight research into a performance appraisal context, found that
reporting an outcome (particularly when negative) significantly increased its
perceived probability. Evaluators also were found to make more causal
attributions to evaluatees in hindsight performance appraisals than in
foresight. In Mitchell and Kalb (1981), however, evaluators had no prior
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involvement with, or commitment to, either the evaluatee or the alternative
courses of action. Subsequent studies have begun to investigate the impact of
such prior evaluator involvement/commitment on hindsight performance appraisals
(see Schoorman, 1988; Brown and Solomon, 1987; Bazerman, Beekun and Schoorman,
1982).
In the present experiment (more fully described below), subjects were both
an advisor to the evaluatee while the evaluatee was making his (her) decision
and subsequently, an evaluator of the evaluatee' s decision. Consider the
following possibilities: 1) the evaluator could either agree or not agree with
the evaluatee 's decision as to the ex ante best course of action, and 2)
subsequent outcomes could indicate that the action which the evaluatee decided
to take either was or was not the ex post best action. The evaluator 's prior
advice concerning courses of action, including recommendation of a particular
course of action, induces his (her) commitment to that course of action. When
the evaluatee adopts such advice, the evaluator becomes committed to the
evaluatee (through agreement on the ex ante best decision) as well as to the
advised course of action. However, when the evaluatee does not adopt the
evaluator 's advice (thus, they disagree on the ex ante best decision), the
evaluator is not committed to the evaluatee (but is still committed to his
[her] advised course of action). Within such a context, not only is it
possible to distinguish between cognitive and motivational explanations for
hindsight effects on performance appraisals, but it also is possible to
separate the motivational explanation into two versions: a "knew- it-all -along"
explanation and an "escalation-of-commitment" explanation.
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Explanations for Hindsight Effects
A Cognitive Explanation
Cognitive explanations are exemplified by Fischhoff (1975) and Hogarth
(1980) in which it is speculated that memory may be restructured by outcome
information such that past uncertainties are not salient. Einhorn and Hogarth
(1981) also suggested that hindsight effects may be due to individual's
"fluency of diagnostic thinking." That is, outcome information may facilitate
development of a coherent story and, once developed, forward inference (i.e.,
prediction of outcomes) appears less uncertain because the multiplicity of
causation has been reduced (i.e., the number of alternative outcomes are
reduced by diminishing those that do not involve the coherent story)
.
Similarly, in hindsight, causal schema for alternative outcomes may be
considerably less available for recall than the schemata for the reported
outcome (see Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
Considering evaluator involvement, evaluators who have been involved with
the evaluatee's decision process prior to knowing the outcome could have
causal schema that are more developed (i.e., schema that contain more detail
and stronger relations) than uninvolved evaluators. This, in turn, could
increase the availability of alternative causal schema and increase the
perceived multiplicity of causation. Thus, the propensity for hindsight
effects would be decreased in performance appraisals made by an involved
evaluator.
1 When the evaluator 's prior involvement includes a commitment to a
If particular target (a course of action and/or an evaluatee) , such commitment
requires additional cognition to justify target choice. In such situations,
the evaluators' schemata for his (her) target of commitment would continue to
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be developed, but such development could inhibit further development of schema
for alternatives that are not targets of commitment. Assuming that the
evaluatee's choice of action focuses the evaluator's attention when appraising
the evaluatee's performance, a less -developed schemata will be activated by the
evaluator when the evaluatee has adopted a course of action to which the
evaluator was not committed. Activating a less -developed schemata, together
with interference by the more -developed schemata for the committed target and
the propensity for elements of less -developed schema to be forgotten, could
cause hindsight effects to be increased in performance appraisals made by an
evaluator who is both involved and committed. Thus, in the present experi-
mental context the cognitive explanation predicts that (also see Figure 2)
:
Performance appraisals will be different in hindsight than in fore-
sight only when the evaluator does not agree with the evaluatee's
decision. In such situations, performance appraisals will be:
a. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the reported
outcome indicates that the evaluatee's decision is the ex post
best decision, and
b. More negative in hindsight than in foresight when the reported
outcome indicates that the evaluatee's decision is not the ex post
best decision.
A Knew- It-All -Along Motivational Explanation
Some researchers have suggested that to maintain their sense of control
and to enhance both their self images and how they are perceived by others,
judges in hindsight are motivated to act as if they always knew what was going
to occur (see Campbell and Tesser, 1983; Ross and Sicoly, 1982; Snyder, 1981;
Ebbsen, 1981; Wong and Weiner, 1981). Thus, when the evaluator is not
committed previously to the evaluatee nor to the evaluatee's course of action,
the evaluator is motivated to act as if he (she) knew all along whatever
outcome is reported. However, when the evaluator is committed to the evaluatee
and/or the evaluatee's course of action, the prior commitment should inhibit
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the evaluator from adopting the knew-it-all-along position when the reported
outcome is less than desirable, but not when the reported outcome is desirable.
In the present experimental context the knew-it-all-along explanation predicts
that (also see Figure 2)
:
Performance appraisals will be different in hindsight than in foresight
only when the reported outcome indicates that the evaluator'
s
advised
course of action is the ex post best decision. In such situations,
performance appraisals will be:
a. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the evaluator
agrees with the evaluatee's decision, and
b. More negative in hindsight that in foresight when the evaluator
does not agree with the evaluatee's decision.
An Escalation-of -Commitment Motivational Explanation
Bazerman, Beekun and Schoorman (1982) reported that subsequent to negative
outcomes, evaluatees were rated more favorably when the evaluator had prior
commitment to the evaluatee than when the evaluator had no such commitment.
This result was interpreted as a performance evaluation analogue to the
"escalation phenomenon" (see Staw, 1976) in which the evaluator is motivated to
increase his (her) appraisals in order to justify his (her) prior commitment.
Schoorman (1988) extended the escalation effect by suggesting that when an
involved evaluator disagrees with the evaluatee's decision, subsequent
performance appraisals would be more negative, presumably because the evaluator
is motivated to justify the initial disagreement. The motive to escalate
commitment, therefore, would be present only when outcomes are negative with
respect to the target of the evaluator 's commitment (the evaluatee and/or a
course of action). Otherwise, the evaluator either has no prior commitment to
escalate or no motive for escalating prior commitment. Thus, in the present
experimental context the escalation-of-commitment explanation predicts that
(also see Table 2)
:
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Performance appraisals will be different in hindsight than in foresight
only when the reported outcomes indicate that the course of action to
which the evaluator is committed is not the ex post best decision. In
such situations, performance appraisals will be:
a. More negative in hindsight than in foresight when the evaluator
does not agree with the evaluatee's decision, and
b. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the evaluator
agrees with the evaluatee's decision.
Method
Subjects
Ninety-three subjects, predominately senior undergraduates who were
enrolled in a cross-section of the disciplines in the business college of a
major state university, served as voluntary participants in a "business
decision appraisal case." To encourage participation, subjects were told that
experts had solved the case and that each of the ten participants with advice
closest to that of the experts would be awarded $25.
The subject had two roles in the experiment. First, the subject was an
advisor to a division capital budgeting committee which was responsible for
determining funding priorities for capital expenditure proposals made by the
various manufacturing groups within the division. Second, the subject was an
evaluator of the division committee's funding priority decisions. Such
evaluations were input to a corporate committee that was responsible for
evaluating and monitoring capital expenditure projects within the company's
numerous divisions (as well as determining the allocation of capital between
divisions)
.
Materials
The decision evaluation case, developed by the researchers, described two
capital expenditure projects that were being proposed by different
manufacturing groups with a company's division. One proposal (project A)
involved addition of a new product line and the other proposal (project B)
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involved expansion of the group's production capacity. The case included
background information on the company, the division and the manufacturing
groups, and additional information on the subject's experimental roles.
Abstracts for each capital expenditure proposal, prepared by the
respective group managements, also were contained in the case. Each abstract
consisted of information on potential market growth, competition, and return on
investment (described as an internal rate of return [IRR]). Additionally, a
listing was included of critical factors to achieve success (with prior
probability assessments) and a graphic presentation of estimated IRRs given
alternative market shares as well as the prior probabilities of achieving those
market shares.
A series of questions asked of the subjects (see Table 1) was designed to
give them advisory input into the division capital budgeting committee's
funding priority decisions for the two proposals (i.e., prior involvement with
the evaluatee's decision process). The subjects were told that the committee
would consider the subject's advice in making its funding priority decisions.
This involvement also was designed to induce subject commitment to the proposal
that he (she) recommended for the highest funding priority.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Manipulations
Two between- subjects independent variables were employed. One variable,
at two levels, was the relationship between subjects' advice and the division
capital budgeting committee's (i.e., the evaluatee's) funding priority
decisions. In one level of this variable the subject and the committee agreed
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on the ex ante best proposal (i.e., the subject's advice was adopted by the
committee) . In the other level the subject and the committee did not agree on
the ex ante best proposal (i.e., the subject's advice was not adopted by the
committee). In the former level, after learning of the committee's agreement,
the subject should be committed to the committee as well as to the advised (and
adopted) proposal. In the latter level, however, after learning of the
committee's disagreement, the subject should not be committed to the committee
nor to the proposal adopted by the committee but should remain committed to his
(her) advised proposal.
The second variable, at three levels, was the relationship between the
division capital budgeting committee's funding priority decisions and the
outcomes for both projects. The outcomes either were not reported (i.e.,
foresight), the committee's decision was the ex post best decision (i.e., one
hindsight version), or the committee's decision was not the ex post best
decision (i.e., a second hindsight version). In the ex post best level, the
subject was told that the proposal to which the division committee assigned
higher funding priority had an IRR substantially above that expected, and the
other (non- funded) proposal had an IRR substantially below that expected. In
the level that was not ex post best, the subject was told that the proposal to
which the division committee assigned higher funding priority had an IRR
substantially below that expected, and the other (non- funded) proposal had an
IRR substantially above that expected. In all instances, the proposal to which
the division capital budgeting committee assigned the highest funding priority
was the only project funded by the corporate committee.
Definitions for the levels of the independent variables are presented in
Figure 1. Examining, for example, the "Evaluator Agree/Committee Decision is
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Ex Post Best" cell in Figure 1, subjects either could advise that project A or
project B be given greater funding priority. If the advice were that project A
be given greater funding priority, the subjects in this treatment were told
that the division capital budgeting committee had decided to assign higher
funding priority to project A. Additionally, the subjects were told that after
five years project A's IRR was substantially greater than expected, and that
project B, undertaken by a competitor, appeared to have an IRR that was
substantially less than expected. If the advice, on the other hand, were that
project B be given greater funding priority, subjects in this treatment were
told an analogous story to that above except that the division committee
assigned higher funding priority to project B, and that project B's IRR was
substantially greater than expected while project A's IRR was substantially
less than expected.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
Procedure
The subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions with
the constraint that cell sizes were approximately equal. The background
information was presented in the form of a written booklet which the subjects
received approximately one-week prior to the experiment. Additional
instructions and experimental stimuli and tasks were presented on video
displays connected to personal computers located in a 20 -machine laboratory.
Following the instructions, subjects first responded to the series of
induced commitment questions. These questions were asked by the division
capital budgeting committee prior to the subjects' either knowing or evaluating
Hindsight Performance Appraisal
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that committee's funding priority decisions. The order of presentation for the
first five questions (as presented in Table 1) within each proposal were
randomized over subjects; the last question within each proposal remained the
same (also the last question in Table 1) . The presentation order of the two
capital expenditure proposals was randomized over subjects.
The subjects then were told: 1) which of the two proposals the division
capital budgeting committee had assigned higher funding priority (together with
the committee's justification), 2) the corporate committee's funding decision
(again, the proposal assigned higher funding priority by the division committee
always was the only project funded) and 3) for hindsight subjects only, the
project outcomes (both for the funded project and for the proposal that was not
funded, but supposedly was undertaken by one of the company's competitors).
Finally, the corporate committee, as part of its capital expenditure
evaluating/monitoring function, asked the subjects to evaluate the division
capital budgeting committee's funding priority decision using the following
question:
How strongly do you believe that the division capital budgeting
committee's decision to recommend funding priority for [proposal
A or B, depending upon treatment assignment] , AT THE TIME THEY
MADE IT, was the best possible judgment?
The response was elicited on a 20-point scale (-10 to 10) in which the end
points were labeled "worst possible judgment" and "best possible judgment."
For analysis this scale was transformed to an 100-point scale (0 to 100)
.
Results
Planned comparisons were used to analyze hindsight effects on the
performance appraisals. The relevant performance appraisal contrasts are based
on differences in evaluations between the two reported outcome (hindsight)
levels and the no reported outcome (foresight) for each level of the
i
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evaluator's agreement with the evaluatee's decision variable. These four
comparisons, presented in Table 2 together with descriptive statistics,
indicate that significant hindsight effects did not occur when the evaluator
agreed with the evaluatee's decision, but did occur when the evaluatee did not
agree. When the evaluator did not agree, performance appraisals were
significantly: a) more positive in hindsight than in foresight when the
reported outcome indicated that the evaluatee's decision was ex post best and
b) more negative in hindsight than in foresight when the reported outcome
indicated that the evaluatee's decision was not the ex post best.
Insert Table 2 About Here
Figure 2 compares these results with the predictions of the cognitive and
motivational explanations. Examining the predictions within the individual
experiment treatments, only one treatment results in unambiguous predictions
(i.e., each of the three explanations making a different prediction): when the
evaluator does not agree with the evaluatee's decision and the reported
outcomes indicate that the evaluatee's decision was ex post best. In this
treatment, the cognitive explanation predicts positive hindsight effects, the
knew-it-all-along explanation predicts no hindsight effects and the
escalation-of -commitment explanation predicts negative hindsight effects. The
results for this treatment indicate that the hindsight effects are
significantly positive (see Table 2). Further, the predictions based on the
cognitive explanation are confirmed in all the other treatments, whereas only
some of the predictions based on the motivational explanations are confirmed
(one out of four for each of the two motivational explanations).
Hindsight Performance Appraisal
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Insert Figure 2 About Here
Discussion
Potential explanations for hindsight effects in the context of managerial
decision appraisal were identified and classified into two categories:
cognitive and motivational. Generally, the results of the experiment supported
the cognitive explanation, and little support for either of the motivational
explanations (knew it all along and escalation of commitment) was evident in
the performance appraisals. Other research, however, has reported support for
the motivational explanations, especially escalation of commitment. What,
then, could account for the difference between the findings of the present and
prior studies? Two factors suggest possible explanations: the normativeness
of the evaluatee's decision process and the extremeness of the reported
outcomes
.
More specifically, to the extent that the evaluatee's decision process is
considered to be normative (i.e., the process is generally accepted as the way
in which such decisions should be made) , the impact of motivational causes of
hindsight effects could be diminished. That is, when a decision process
generally is considered to be "correct," there is less need in the face of
negative outcomes to justify the decision and less basis for maintaining that
one knew it all along. Similarly, reported outcomes that imply degrees of
success, rather than success versus failure, could diminish motivational causes
of hindsight effects. When outcomes imply a lower degree of success than
expected, there is less need to justify the decision (relative to a reported
failure) and less need for maintaining that one knew it all along.
i
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In the present study, the normativeness of the evaluatee's decision
process was relatively high, especially when compared, for example, to a
personnel hiring decision (i.e, the justifications given by the division
committee for its funding priority decisions were couched in terms of internal
(time -adjusted) rates of return and estimated risks of such returns, both of
which are generally accepted [normative] methods of evaluating capital
expenditures). Further, the reported outcomes implied degrees of success
(i.e., the reported outcome that was not the ex post best outcome was still a
marginally successful outcome). Therefore, in the present experiment,
motivational causes of hindsight effects in the managerial decision appraisals
could be diminished relative to the experimental contexts of predecessor
studies
.
In addition to providing a means of distinguishing between the viability
of the various hindsight effect explanations, the experimental data have
implications for the design of performance appraisal systems. In particular,
the performance appraisal process may be designed by management, intentionally
or unintentionally, such that either decision process quality or outcome
valence is the major basis for appraisal. Within the context of capital
expenditure evaluation, arguements have been made that in general, evaluation
of any single expenditure (i.e, short- run evaluation) should focus primarily on
decision process quality, whereas evaluation of a series of such decisions
(i.e., long-run evaluation) also must focus on outcome valences. However,
consistent with prior research, our results suggest that without management
attention to process design issues, outcome valence, even in the short-run, can
significantly affect performance appraisals.
Hindsight Performance Appraisal
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Table 1
The Series of Questions Designed to Induce Subjects' Commitment to
Their Advised Course of Action
For each proposal, the division capital budgeting committee asked subjects to:
1) Assess the probability that the IRR would be equal to or greater than
X% if the proposal were to be implemented (where p[IRR > X%] =-0.25),
2) Indicate the extent of their agreement with group management's estimate
of the chance that the IRR would be below the company's desired minimum
if the proposal were to be implemented,
3) Indicate the extent of their agreement with group management's estimate
of the most likely IRR if the proposal were to be implemented,
4) Indicate the extent of their agreement with group management's estimate
of the most likely incremental market share if the proposal were to be
implemented,
5) Assess the overall reliabililty that should be placed on the estimates
and assessments contained within the proposal abstract, and indicate
estimates or assessments (if any) contained within the proposal
abstract that the subject thought to be unreliable, and
6) Indicate the funding priority that [the subject recommends] the
division capital budgeting committee assign to the proposal.
Table 2
Hindsight Effects on Performance Appraisals
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:
Ex Ante
Decision
Agreement*
Agree
Agree
Agree
Not Agree
Not Agree
Not Agree
Reported
Outcome
None
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
None
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
Standard
Mean Deviation n
85.16 18.48 16
92.67 7.53 15
86.67 11.75 15
43.44 22.86 16
62.33 21.03 15
26.56 11.79 16
PLANNED COMPARISONS:
Hindsight Treatment
Reported
Agreement Outcome
Cornp.arisonc
Standard
Mean Error t(87) P<
7.51 6.45 1.165 .24d
1.51 6.45 0.234
18.89 6.45 2.930 .01d
-16.88 6.34 -2.660 .01d
Agree Ex Post Best
Agree Not Ex Post Best
Not Agree Ex Post Best
Not Agree Not Ex Post Best
aEx ante agreement is between the decision advised by the evaluator and
the decision made by the evaluatee.
Reported outcomes are with respect to the evaluatee 's decision. The
"None" level is foresight.
cHindsight appraisal - Foresight appraisal.
d0ne- tailed.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Experimental Independent Variables.
I
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Figure Caption
Figure 2
.
Hindsight effects on performance appraisals: Predictions based on
cognitive and motivational explanations compared with experimental results.
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EVALUATEE'S DECISION
IS EX POST BEST
EVALUATEE'S DECISION
IS NOT EX POST BEST
EXPLANATION PREDICTION: EXPLANATION PREDICTION:
COGNITIVE COGNITIVE
KNEW- IT-ALL-ALONG + KNEW- IT-ALL-ALONG
ESCALATION ESCALATION +
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
EXPLANATION PREDICTION: EXPLANATION PREDICTION:
COGNITIVE + COGNITIVE
KNEW- IT -ALL-ALONG KNEW- IT -ALL-ALONG
ESCALATION - ESCALATION
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT + EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
Prediction/Result legend:
= performance appraisals not different in hindsight than in
foresight,
+ = performance appraisals more positive in hindsight than in
foresight, and
= performance appraisals more negative in hindsight than in
foresight.


